When is suspension of a public inquiry 'necessary'?

The Supreme Court confirms scope of Minister’s decision to suspend an inquiry under s13(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005

A recent judgment of the Supreme Court provides useful insight into Ministerial powers to suspend inquiries under section 13(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005 (‘the Act’).

In the matter of an application by JR222 for Judicial Review (Appellant) (Northern Ireland) [2024] UKSC 35, the Supreme Court held that the true interpretation of ‘necessary’ in section 13(1) was a question that must be answered as a whole: applying to both the period of the suspension of the inquiry and the decision to suspend.

We explain the decision below and what it might mean for those involved in public inquiries.

The case

The decision came in an appeal of a judicial review claim relating to the Muckamore Abbey Hospital Inquiry (the ‘Muckamore Inquiry’), a statutory inquiry established to examine the issue of abuse of patients at the Muckamore Abbey Hospital (the ‘Hospital’) in relation to events between 2 December 1999 and 14 June 2021.[1]

The Inquiry was announced on 8 September 2020, formally set up on 11 October 2021 and has been in hearings since June 2022. As at the time of writing, the Inquiry’s oral evidence hearings have now concluded and closing statements are scheduled for March 2025.

In parallel to the Muckamore Inquiry there are ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions relating to the alleged abuse. In particular, the appellant (‘JR222’) is a former staff nurse who was charged with criminal offences relating to events alleged to have occurred at the Hospital in 2017.

In June 2022, JR222 requested that the then Minister for Health suspend the Inquiry under s13 of the Act pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings against her (and others).

Section 13(1) of the Act states:

“(1) The Minister may at any time, by notice to the chairman, suspend an inquiry for such period as appears to him to be necessary to allow for—

(a) the completion of any other investigation relating to any of the matters to which the inquiry relates, or

(b) the determination of any civil or criminal proceedings (including proceedings before a disciplinary tribunal) arising out of any of those matters.”

The Minister refused to suspend the Inquiry on the basis that it was not necessary to do so to allow for the determination of the criminal proceedings.[2]

In refusing to suspend, the Minister noted that various measures had been put in place in the Muckamore Inquiry to protect the integrity of the parallel criminal proceedings – including (but not limited to) a Memorandum of Understanding between the Inquiry and relevant police services, confidentiality undertakings by Inquiry core participants, an undertaking from the Director of Public Prosecutions about the use of Inquiry evidence and restriction orders.[3]

JR222 issued a judicial review claim against the refusal to suspend, claiming (amongst other things) that the Minister misinterpreted the law by applying a necessity test that was not explicitly required under s13(1) - arguing that the Minister ‘applied the concept of necessity to the entirety of his discretion’ and ‘failed to appreciate that the concept of necessity applies only to fixing the duration of any period of suspension’.[4]

The decision

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed JR222’s appeal, preferring the Minister’s interpretation of s13(1) and confirming that the necessity test ‘applies to both the purposes in section 13(1)(a) and (b) and to the period of suspension’.[5]

In reaching his decision, Lord Stephens SCJ (with whom the Court agreed) provided eight reasons, including:

1. The meaning of the words used by Parliament was consistent with the Minister’s interpretation.[6]

2. The Minister’s interpretation was ‘put beyond all doubt by reference to the external aid of the legislative debate’.[7]

3. The Minister’s interpretation was supported by the statutory purpose of inquiries, being to address public concerns.[8] By contrast, the appellant’s interpretation would ‘result in delay to the public interest being served by an inquiry where it was not necessary for the delay to occur for one or other of the purposes set out in section 13(1)(a) or (b)’.[9]

4. If s13(1) involved a two-stage process, as the appellant submitted, then it would ‘create the illogical result that a stricter test applies at the less important secondary stage of the period of suspension rather than at the anterior and more important stage of forming an evaluation as to whether the inquiry should be suspended…’.[10]

5. The Minister’s interpretation was supported by paragraph 26 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill.[11]

6. If s13(1) involved two separate stages, then once a decision to suspend was made the period of suspension would be outside of the Minister’s control – so applying a test of necessity just to the period of suspension would be illogical. As such ‘the period of suspension cannot be necessary unless it is also necessary to suspend an inquiry for one of the purposes in section 13(1)(a) and (b)’.

7. The absence of any test of necessity in the Inquiries Act s14(1)(b) (regarding a decision to end an inquiry) did not support the appellant’s interpretation of s13(1) – it is appropriate that the power to suspend requires a higher test than the power to bring an inquiry to an end.[12]

8. Just because there is no mention in s13(5) of a requirement for a Minister to set out reasons as to why it is necessary to suspend an inquiry, does not change the nature of the decision or the test to be applied – the reasons under s13(5) should include why a decision was taken to suspend an inquiry ‘by reference to the language of necessity’.[13]

The practicalities

The threshold for suspension of an inquiry is a high one. Core participants and other interested parties involved in parallel proceedings on matters to which an inquiry relates should note that only truly necessary circumstances will permit a Minister to suspend an inquiry under s13(1) of the Act.

Where inquiries run in parallel with other investigations or proceedings, those engaged with both need to be alive to self-incrimination, evidential cross-over and disclosure issues. An inquiry may have appropriate measures in place, but early engagement with the inquiry team may assist to ensure the integrity of your client’s civil or criminal proceedings. Those working on inquiry teams should consider whether their Terms of Reference may lead to overlap with parallel investigations or proceedings - the measures adopted in the Muckamore Inquiry, and discussed in the decision, are a useful starting point - but every case will be different.

TLT’s Public Inquiries and Public Law team has significant experience working with inquiry chairs, prosecuting authorities and police forces in the context of public inquiries.

To discuss the subject matter of this article further or for assistance with public inquiries in general, reach out to our team of expert lawyers.

Contributor: William Massingberd-Mundy

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[1] Muckamore Abbey Hospital Inquiry.
[2] In the matter of an application by JR222 for Judicial Review (Appellant) (Northern Ireland) [2024] UKSC 35 (‘Judgment’), [44].
[3] Judgment, ‘(g) Measures taken by the Inquiry, the PSNI and the PPS to protect the integrity of the criminal investigations and proceedings’, [29] - [43].
[4] Judgment, [51].
[5] Judgment, [82].
[6] Judgment, [83].
[7] Judgment, [84].
[8] Judgment, [85].
[9] Judgment, [85].
[10] Judgment, [86].
[11] Judgment, [87].
[12] Judgment, [89].
[13] Judgment, [90].

This publication is intended for general guidance and represents our understanding of the relevant law and practice as at December 2024. Specific advice should be sought for specific cases. For more information see our terms & conditions.