Infrastructure Planning Blog

Today’s entry looks at the interim report of the Nuclear Taskforce and a proposed DCO revocation.

Taskmasters

This week saw the publication of the Nuclear Taskforce’s interim report. A copy can be found here. Readers of Issue 4 may recall that my colleague Mustafa Latif-Aramesh is a member of the Taskforce and has been closely involved in the production of the interim report.  I have had no involvement and this summary is based solely on my own observations as an interested onlooker. 

The taskforce was set up with a remit of identifying reforms to the UK’s nuclear regulation system, which is described as “increasingly complex and bureaucratic”. Its focus is on nuclear safety, environmental and planning regulation.  Nuclear security and safeguards are not in scope, nor is nuclear fusion (as opposed to fission, which is)

The Taskforce is seeking feedback on its emerging thinking by 8 September. It will then publish its final recommendations in the Autumn, which will be covered in a blog entry at that time.

It is a very readable document at 30 pages plus light annexes and well worth a read. Here are some of the key messages:

• The potted summary of nuclear regulation in the UK in Chapter 4 is helpful.  But it also highlights the complex, interlinked and overlapping regulations in place, operated by different regulators who have varying approaches to managing risk.
• The Taskforce consider that the “ALARP” principle, which requires nuclear operators to demonstrate they have reduced risks to As Low As Reasonably Practicable, is giving rise to some disproportionate outcomes. There is evidence that the term is being interpreted too conservatively, with costly and risk-averse measures being imposed which exceed what is required by the ALARP principle. There is too much emphasis on the ‘local view’ and too little on broader strategic considerations, such as cost, programme delays, or national imperatives. In addition, licence holders are not accustomed to challenging demands for stricter regulation, so over time standards are getting progressively higher without regard to their cost or proportionality.  Views are sought on how these issues can be addressed in practice. 
• The requirements for Habitats Regulations Assessment and Environmental Impact Assessment are said to “lack proportionality”, which results in high-cost mitigation measures being implemented, sometimes without improving overall environmental outcomes. The Taskforce think that “fundamental and meaningful changes may be required to Habitats Regulations in order to reduce risk aversion”.  Not dissimilar therefore from the Government’s own post-implementation review of the Habitats Regulations, which I highlighted in issue 14. They also think part of the answer might be in modifying the rules around judicial review; on that issue, the Taskforce have asked consultees “what measures could prevent vexatious judicial reviews from driving disproportionate approaches that increase costs and delay”. The suggestion, presumably, being that the measures set out in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill might not go far enough.
• To address regulatory complexity, the Taskforce is asking what specific consents or regulations could be consolidated into a single process to avoid duplication. Views are also sought on changing regulatory processes and boundaries, such as merging of regulators. 
• The planning regime is not well suited to emerging technologies such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs), as they must meet existing safety standards designed for traditional, large-scale reactors. This stifles innovation, because technology which makes new reactors fundamentally safer may not receive regulatory recognition.
• Delays associated with the NSIP regime (e.g., lengthy pre-application and decision stages) are seen as barriers to entry. There is little to no recognition of a “fleet approach”, whereby bulk approvals can be sought for identical or largely similar designed schemes.  The NPSs were drafted with older reactor types in mind, which gives rise to flawed or disproportionate planning outcomes, particularly where the semi-urban population density criteria is concerned (these are the rules that limit the population density around a proposed site to prevent excessive risk in the event of an accident), which is currently geared towards older reactor types, not SMRs and AMRs. Thoughts on NSIP / NPS reforms are sought.
• Thoughts are also invited on ways to tackle the scarcity of nuclear expertise, known in the nuclear industry as Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel. Negative cultural behaviours, such as risk aversion and complex processes and procedures, are also cited.
• The Taskforce also think there are opportunities for international harmonisation. This is another barrier to entry, since a reactor design acceptable in one country might be refused in another, often on bureaucratic rather than substantive safety grounds.

The report is an important step forward in unlocking the UK’s nuclear potential. What Government does with the recommendations will be interesting to see.  The Fukushima disaster in 2011 intensified public concerns about nuclear safety; how will reforms aimed at cutting red tape play out in the court of public opinion?

It’s [all] about the money, money, money

On 7 August, the Secretary of State gave notice that it is proposing to make an order to revoke the A1 in Northumberland: Morpeth to Ellingham DCO 2024. The 2024 DCO is here. The proposed Order is here and the explanation here.

Under Schedule 6 of the Planning Act 2008, the SoS can revoke a DCO if there are exceptional circumstances that make it appropriate to do so. The SoS thinks there are exceptional circumstances in this case and is inviting representations on the proposed revocation to be submitted by 12 September. The exceptional circumstances boil down to the following:

“Following the Government’s budget announcement on the 30 October 2024, the A1 Morpeth to Ellingham scheme has been cancelled. The scheme was identified as having poor value for money and limited economic benefits for the region.” 

Apparently, the cost of the scheme had more than doubled from £290m in 2014 to £0.5bn. I have not seen how much has already been spent on it.

This would be the first ever DCO revocation, so one to remember for your next DCO pub quiz.

This publication is intended for general guidance and represents our understanding of the relevant law and practice as at August 2025. Specific advice should be sought for specific cases. For more information see our terms & conditions.