Contracts Matter

June 2026

Welcome to the summer edition of our contract law update series. In this update, we provide a round-up of some of the most significant contract law cases since our January update to help our clients stay up to date when drafting and negotiating contracts.

Date published

Tuesday 2 June 2026

CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Supreme Court interprets standard form termination clause

Providence Building Services Ltd v Hexagon Housing Association Ltd [2026]

contract interpretation

Court of Appeal upholds ordinary meaning of "undisputed claims"

Sahara Energy Resource Ltd v Societe Nationale de Raffinage SA (Sonara) [2026]

IMPLIED TERMINATION RIGHTS

Court of Appeal infers right to terminate licence of indefinite duration

Zaha Hadid Ltd v The Zaha Hadid Foundation [2026]

CONFLICTING CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS

Court of Appeal clarifies the hierarchy of conflicting dispute resolution clauses

Tyson International Company Ltd v GIC Re, India, Corporate Member Ltd [2026]

innominate terms

High Court confirms that time-limited obligations are not automatically conditions

SLB v PAK [2026]

CONTRACT FORMATION

Subject to contract? Escrow letter binding despite subsequent formal escrow agreement

GMC Utilities Group Ltd v Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd [2026]

Contract interpretation

Supreme Court interprets standard form termination clause

Providence Building Services Ltd v Hexagon Housing Association Ltd [2026]

The Supreme Court applied well-established principles of contractual interpretation, in a case that highlighted the challenges that this can pose in practice. The case is of particular interest in relation to the interpretation of standard form contracts.

Facts

The appeal concerned the interpretation of a termination clause in a construction contract. The contract incorporated the JCT (Joint Contracts Tribunal) Design and Build Contract (2016 edition), a standard form contract widely used in the construction industry.

The contract was between Hexagon Housing Association Ltd (Employer) and Providence Building Services Ltd (Contractor) for the construction of buildings in Purley and included a payment timetable.

The central issue involved two late payments by the Employer: the first in December2022 (paid14 days late) and the second in May 2023, which prompted the Contractor to issue a termination notice the following day.

The Contractor argued that it was entitled to terminate following two late payments, provided a specified default notice had been served in respect of the first late payment (which it had). The Employer contended that termination was only permissible if the first late payment had not been made within 28 days of its due date and that, since it was paid within that window, no right to terminate had accrued.

The trial judge held in favour of the Employer, but that was overturned by the Court of Appeal who held that the Contractor was entitled to terminate if the Employer failed to pay it on time twice, even if the first payment was paid within 28 days. The Employer appealed to the Supreme Court.

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Decision

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that the Contractor was not entitled to terminate the contract. The central question was the interpretation of clause 8.9 of the JCT contract, the key provisions of which were as follows:

Clause 8.9.1 entitled the Contractor to give notice to the Employer specifying any default, including a failure to pay by the final date for payment (a "specified default").
Clause 8.9.3 provided that if a specified default continued for 28 days from receipt of notice, the Contractor could terminate by a further notice within 21 days of the expiry of that period.
Clause 8.9.4 provided that if the Contractor "for any reason" did not give the further notice under clause 8.9.3, but the Employer repeated a specified default, the Contractor could terminate upon or within 28 days of such repetition.

The Court of Appeal had interpreted “for any reason” in clause 8.9.4 as broad enough to cover a situation where the Contractor had no accrued right to terminate under clause 8.9.3 because the first default was remedied within 28 days. It also considered this interpretation achieved symmetry with the Employer’s termination rights under clause 8.4.3.

The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal's interpretation of clause 8.9.4, holding that the Contractor must have an accrued right to terminate under clause 8.9.3 before clause 8.9.4 can apply.

The Court provided three main reasons for this conclusion:

The opening words of clause 8.9.4 reference the preceding clause, which would be superfluous if the provision merely required two instances of default. If repetition alone were sufficient, the clause would simply begin with "if the Employer repeats a specified default” without referencing clause 8.9.3.
It would be an extreme outcome if the Contractor could terminate for two payments that were each only one day late. The termination right is less extreme when triggered only after a first payment has been delayed beyond 28 days, indicating a particularly serious breach.
The symmetry argument based on the Employer's rights under clause 8.4.3 was rejected. The Employer's and Contractor's contractual obligations were fundamentally different, and their termination rights were clearly asymmetrical in other respects. The different wording of the respective termination clauses suggests they were not intended to have identical meanings.

More broadly, the Supreme Court considered the correct approach to the interpretation of industry-wide standard form contracts, confirming that the established modern approach to contractual interpretation (based on the objective intentions of the contracting parties in the relevant context) applies. However, it was stated that:

“It is not a departure from that approach to say that, where parties choose to use an industry-wide standard form, it can generally be taken that their objective intentions in the relevant context are that their respective rights and obligations should be consistent with those of other parties using the same form and should reflect the objective intentions of those who were concerned with the drawing up of that standard form agreement.”

Key takeaways

Beyond the impact of the interpretation of JCT contracts, the Supreme Court decision (and the differing conclusions of the trial and Court of Appeal judgments) is a reminder of the challenges of agreeing on the meaning of words, even in a carefully drafted contract.
The decision provides useful analysis and guidance on the current law of contractual interpretation, including in relation to B2B standard form contracts (where inequality of bargaining power is not a factor). It is of particular interest that:

“In interpreting such an industry-wide standard form contract, the admissible background context may include past decisions of the courts on, and practice in relation to, clauses in an earlier version of the standard form….. However, the general position taken by the courts is that, subject to exceptions, an examination of what has been termed the “archaeology of the forms” is to be discouraged.”

Contract interpretation

Court of Appeal upholds ordinary meaning of "undisputed claims”

Sahara Energy Resource Ltd v Societe Nationale de Raffinage SA (Sonara) [2026]

The Court of Appeal has applied key principles of contractual interpretation to overturn a first instance ruling that “strained” words from their ordinary and natural meaning.

Facts

Sahara Energy Resource Ltd (Sahara) supplied multiple cargoes of crude oil to Société Nationale de Raffinage SA (Sonara), a Cameroonian state-owned oil refinery, under a contract concluded in 2013.

The dispute arose out of various unpaid invoices for cargoes shipped between 2013 and 2016. Sonara was persistently late making payments. The principal amounts and contractual interest were eventually paid, but the delays caused Sahara to sustain further losses (comprising incremental financing costs, bank penalties, and foreign exchange losses).

Following a reconciliation meeting in September 2019, the parties produced and signed a Joint Report which categorised the amounts owed. Certain sums were listed as "Undisputed Claims" (totalling approximately US$76.97 million) and others as "Disputed Claims" (which Sonara expressly rejected). The Resolution section stated that Sonara would propose flexible payment terms and reconvene for "further negotiations on the undisputed claims." The dispute continued, with Sahara issuing proceedings.

The primary issue in dispute at first instance was whether the Joint Report was a binding legal agreement for payment by Sonara of the sums listed under Undisputed Claims.

At first instance, Cockerill J held that the Joint Report created a binding agreement only in respect of the Principal Sums and Reconciled Claims, concluding that "Undisputed" did not carry its ordinary meaning and that any agreement on those claims was conditional upon approval from the Government of Cameroon. In the court’s view, the parties had used “Reconciled” to mean agreed as to both liability and quantum, but “Undisputed” to mean agreed in relation to only quantum or liability.

The judge also gave weight to the reference to “further negotiations on the undisputed claims," reasoning that if claims were agreed, no further negotiation would be required.

Decision

The Court of Appeal allowed Sahara's appeal, holding, in relation to the meaning of ”Undisputed Claims” that the ordinary and natural meaning was simply that there was no dispute about those claims, and there was no proper basis for departing from that plain meaning.

The court noted that the format of the Undisputed Claims table was identical to those for the agreed sums. Neither of these included a "Comments" column, whereas the Disputed Claims table expressly recorded Sonara's rejection, demonstrating that the parties were clear how to signal a live dispute when they intended to do so.

The court stated “when [the Resolution] is read as a whole, the reference to "further negotiations on the undisputed claims" can perfectly well be understood as a reference to further negotiations that might be required in relation to the proposals that Sonara was to make for flexible payment terms and a schedule for payment of the Undisputed Amounts. It was not necessary to adopt a strained interpretation of "Undisputed Claims" in order to give meaning to "negotiations" in [the Resolution].”

There was equally nothing in the Joint Report to indicate that any binding agreement in relation to this strand of loss was conditional on the Government of Cameroon's approval, and no such condition had been communicated to Sahara.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeal corrected what many considered to be a surprising first instance ruling and the decision reiterates key principles of contractual interpretation.

For contract lawyers, the case highlights that:

It is not necessary to adopt a strained interpretation of words in order to give meaning to other parts of a contract.
Structure and format matter: the formatting of the columns in the document was relevant in indicating whether the parties intended a matter to be agreed or still in dispute.
Conditions precedent should be explicit: if third party approval, such as government consent, is required, this should be stated in clear terms.

Overall, the case highlights that settlement and reconciliation documents should be drafted with precision to avoid ambiguity.

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Implied termination rights

Court of Appeal infers right to terminate licence of indefinite duration

Zaha Hadid Ltd v The Zaha Hadid Foundation [2026]

Reversing the High Court’s decision, the Court of Appeal held that a trade mark licence expressed to continue "indefinitely" was terminable by either party on reasonable notice. The contract gave the trade mark owner express termination rights, including a right to terminate for convenience, but conferred no equivalent right on the licensee. The court inferred a mutual right to terminate, despite the absence of an express termination right for the licensee.

Facts

The appeal related to a trade mark licence (dated 2013) between Zaha Hadid Limited (ZHL), an international architecture practice, and Dame Zaha Hadid as the original licensor. The registered trade marks for ZAHA HADID were passed to the Zaha Hadid Foundation (Foundation), following her death in 2016. ZHL wished to continue to use the trade marks but also wished to renegotiate the terms of the contract, as it considered the licence fee of 6% of all net income to be too high.

Clause 12.1 provided: "This agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and shall continue indefinitely, unless terminated earlier in accordance with this clause 12."

Clauses 12.2 and 12.3 conferred termination rights exclusively on the licensor: namely, a right to terminate on three months' written notice without cause, and a right to terminate with immediate effect in cases of payment default, material or repeated breach, or insolvency.

The High Court held that the contract contained no term giving ZHL a right to terminate, with the result that ZHL was locked into the contract forever. The judge also rejected ZHL’s fallback argument based on restraint of trade.

Decision

The Court of Appeal identified a two-stage approach, derived from the reasoning applied in Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Millennium Productions Ltd [1948]. The first step was to determine, as a matter of construction, whether the parties intended the agreement to run in perpetuity or not. The Court explained:

“A contract which is not intended to be perpetual in this sense (and has no other explicit duration) is one in which the duration is indefinite. The difference between these two constructions is simple enough. If the true construction of the parties’ intention is that the agreement is in perpetuity (for one or both parties), then, absent express terms, that leaves no room for an inference that such party or parties could terminate on reasonable notice. On the other hand, an agreement intended to be of indefinite duration necessarily and within its own terms contemplates that it can be brought to an end at some unspecified time in the future.”

As the word used in clause 12.1 was "indefinitely" and not "perpetually", the court noted this was "not a promising start" for the Foundation's position. The alternative construction, treating 'indefinitely' as meaning 'perpetually', would mean the contract was literally intended to continue forever unless terminated by the licensor - which, from either party's point of view, would not make business sense.

Leading on to the second step, the court considered that the only way to give effect to a common intention that the agreement is of indefinite duration (rather than perpetual) would be that all parties have the ability to bring it to an end – i.e. to terminate on reasonable notice.

The Foundation had argued that the one-sided termination rights in clauses 12.2 and 12.3 effectively excluded an implied mutual right. However, the court considered that this argument only worked if the power to terminate on reasonable notice would be inconsistent with clauses 12.2 and 12.3, but it was not.

Key takeaways

“Indefinitely" does not mean "perpetual". If parties truly intend a licence to be perpetual or to confer one-sided termination rights, that intention must be made explicit in the drafting in clear and unambiguous terms - otherwise, the courts may infer a mutual right to terminate on reasonable notice.
Express one-sided termination rights alone will not bind a counterparty in perpetuity. The Court of Appeal concluded that "the only way" to give effect to an intention that an agreement is of indefinite duration is to infer a right for either party to terminate on reasonable notice.
Relying on a court to determine reasonable notice after the fact creates uncertainty. The safest approach is to include a clear, mutual right to terminate for convenience on a fixed notice period, expressly stated in the contract, so that both parties have a defined and predictable exit mechanism from the outset.

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Conflicting contractual provisions

Court of Appeal clarifies the hierachy of conflicting dispute resolution clauses

Tyson International Company Ltd v GIC RE, India, Corporate Member Ltd [2026]

In February, the Court of Appeal delivered a significant decision in a dispute where, as a result of multiple contracts governing the same relationship, there were conflicting dispute resolution clauses. The judgment offers guidance on how hierarchy clauses will be interpreted.

Facts

The initial dispute was triggered following a fire at Tyson Foods' poultry facility in Alabama. Tyson Foods was insured by its Bermudan ‘captive’ insurer, Tyson International Company Ltd (Tyson), which accepted the claim. Tyson was in turn reinsured by GIC Re, India, Corporate Member Ltd (GIC).

The reinsurance was placed by way of two Market Reform Contracts (MRCs), signed on 30 June 2021, followed by two corresponding facultative certificates in the form of Market Uniform Re-insurance Agreements (MURAs) on 9 July 2021. Following the fire at the Tyson Foods facility in Alabama, GIC refused to indemnify Tyson and purported to rescind the reinsurance, alleging that the insured value of the Alabama facility had been significantly understated. This gave rise to a jurisdictional dispute: should the coverage claim be heard by the English Commercial Court (as per the MRCs) or referred to New York for arbitration (as per the MURAs)? The MRCs contained an English law and jurisdiction clause and the MURAs contained a New York arbitration clause.

The answer ultimately turned on a "confusion clause" contained in the MURAs, which provided: "RI slip [the MRC] to take precedence over reinsurance certificate [the MURA] in case of confusion."

For context, the MRC is the standard form of insurance and reinsurance contract in the London market, containing a complete schedule of policy terms. The MURA form, by contrast, is a standard form of reinsurance policy commonly used in the property reinsurance market in the United States.

Decision

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed both of GIC's grounds of appeal and upheld the Commercial Court's decision, including upholding the permanent anti-suit injunction (granted by the first instance judge), confirming that GIC was restricted to litigation in the UK and not permitted to arbitrate in New York.

GIC had made its appeal on the following grounds:

1) GIC argued that the confusion clause applied only to contradictions within the MURA itself, not to conflicts between the MURA and the MRC. The Court of Appeal rejected this, applying the ordinary and natural meaning of the language. Additionally, the court held that it would make little commercial sense for parties to include a ‘confusion’ clause designed only to resolve internal inconsistencies within a single document, especially when commercial parties generally take care to avoid such inconsistencies in the first place.

2) GIC’s second submission was that the two dispute resolution clauses could be reconciled by reading the English jurisdiction clause as conferring only a supervisory role over the New York arbitration. In support, GIC relied on authorities which held that an arbitration clause and an exclusive jurisdiction clause can coexist, even across different documents. The Court of Appeal distinguished Tyson from those cases on the basis that each involved a single contractual arrangement with no ‘confusion’ clause. Where no inconsistency exists, it may involve the court “reading down the exclusive jurisdiction clause so that little is left of it”. Here, however, there was an express clause giving precedence to the MRC. The court endorsed the observation of Foxton J: "it seems to me that to try and read the arbitration agreement in the subordinate document, together with the English jurisdiction clause in the primary document here, would fundamentally change the meaning of the former."

Key takeaways

Consistency across documents: Where a transaction is documented by more than one contract, parties must ensure that clauses are consistent across all of them. Where that is not possible, a clear hierarchy clause should be included to resolve any conflict.
Courts will not rewrite the bargain: Where a clause gives precedence to one document over another, the courts will give effect to it as written. They will not strain to reconcile conflicting clauses in a way that fundamentally alters what the parties agreed.
Anti-suit injunctions: The case also highlights the effectiveness of anti-suit injunctions to restrain a party from pursuing proceedings outside the agreed forum and avoid parallel proceedings. Anti-suit relief was also granted in J.P. Morgan Securities Plc v VTB Bank PJSC [2026], where the Court of Appeal upheld anti-suit injunctions preventing a Russian bank from pursuing claims in Russia in breach of arbitration agreements.

Innominate terms

High Court confirms that time-limited obligations are not automatically conditions

SLB & Ors v PAK & Ors [2026]

The High Court found that a requirement in several shipbuilding contracts to provide a refund guarantee within 120 days was an innominate term and not a condition. The buyers were entitled to cancel the contracts as a consequence of the seller’s breach, but not to claim loss of bargain damages.

Facts

In ten individual shipbuilding contracts, three defendants (the Seller) agreed to build and sell to ten claimants (collectively, the Buyers) ten container vessels each with a capacity of either 12,690 or 15,000 TEU. The contract price for each vessel was payable in four instalments, three prior to delivery and one instalment upon delivery and acceptance of the vessel. The Buyers’ obligation to make the pre delivery instalments was conditional upon receipt of a refund guarantee. Without such a guarantee, the Buyers were under no obligation to make payment.

Article X(A)(f) of the contracts provided that the Seller would be in default if it failed to provide a refund guarantee within 120 days after the date the contract was amended, novated, restated or such later date as the Buyer may designate from “time to time”. In such case, the Buyer could terminate, rescind or cancel the contract. The ten shipbuilding contracts were subsequently novated, and the Seller failed to provide the refund guarantees within the 120-day period, following which the Buyers terminated the contracts.

In the subsequent arbitrations, each of the Buyers claimed for loss of bargain damages of between around USD 73 to 83 million for loss of profit and the cost of purchasing a substitute vessel. The Tribunal held that the obligation in each contract to provide refund guarantees in 120 days was an innominate term and not a condition. While the Buyers were entitled to terminate the contracts, they were not entitled to claim loss of bargain damages.

Decision

The High Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the Tribunal’s decision, finding that Article X(A)(f) constituted an innominate term rather than a condition. In reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed the leading authorities on conditions, warranties and innominate terms, and confirmed that the classification of a term is a question of construction.

As Lord Scarman explained in Bunge v Tradax [1981]:

“A condition is a term, the failure to perform which entitles the other party to treat the contract as at an end…. A warranty is a term, breach of which sounds in damages but does not terminate, or entitle the other party to terminate, the contract. An innominate or intermediate term is one, the effect of non-performance of which the parties expressly or (as is more usual) impliedly agree will depend upon the nature and the consequences of breach… “

The High Court confirmed that, where the contract does not make clear that a term is a condition or warranty, it will generally be treated as innominate.

The court noted that Article X(A)(f) did not expressly describe the obligation to provide a refund guarantee within 120 days as a condition. The Buyers' reliance on the phrase "by no later than 120 days" was insufficient; while it fixed a deadline and triggered a right to cancel, it did not establish that any breach would attract loss of bargain damages.

The Buyers argued that refund guarantees were fundamental to the contracts, but the court upheld the tribunal's finding that their absence would not render the contracts unworkable. Distinguishing this case from Bunge v Tradax, the court considered that the obligation to provide a refund guarantee was not a condition precedent to the performance of an essential contractual obligation by the other party. Under Article X(A)(f), where no refund guarantee was provided, the Buyers’ obligation to make pre delivery payments simply did not arise; it was deferred rather than impossible. A delay exceeding 120 days in providing a refund guarantee would not prevent the performance of the contract.

Further, the Buyers’ contractual ability to extend the longstop date "from time to time" suggested that the parties did not treat the time limit as entitling the Buyers to terminate regardless of the breach. The essence of the contract was the provision of the vessels, not the refund guarantees.

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Key takeaways

The inclusion of longstop wording will not automatically lead the court to conclude a term is a condition, particularly when the deadline is capable of extension. The question remains one of contractual construction.
Unless it is clear from the wording or contractual context that a term is intended to be a condition or a warranty, it will be an innominate term. The court will not interpret terms as conditions unless required by the contract.
Precise drafting is therefore required where parties intend that a particular obligation should have the status of a condition.

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Contract formation

Subject to contract? Escrow letter binding despite subsequent formal escrow agreement

GMC Utilities Group Ltd v Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd [2026]

The High Court held that a solicitors’ letter regarding escrow arrangements, exchanged to avert a performance bond call, was binding notwithstanding the parties' earlier 'subject to contract' negotiations and a subsequent formal Escrow Agreement.

Facts

The defendant (SEI) was the main contractor for the construction of an undersea electricity interconnector between Wales and Ireland. It subcontracted the onshore direct cable package to the claimant (GMC) under a sub-contract dated 8 August 2022.

Practical completion was due on 14 June 2024 but was not achieved on time, and a subsequent adjudication revised the Taking-Over Date to 31 July 2024. On 28 October 2024, SEI made a demand under the performance bond, contending that GMC had failed to meet the Taking-Over Date, triggering delay damages.

The bond call prompted negotiations, culminating in a letter dated 8 November 2024 from GMC's solicitors to SEI's solicitors. That letter contained an undertaking to pay approximately €3.9 million (Escrow Sum) into an escrow account, with SEI agreeing to withdraw the bond demand. Paragraph 6 of the letter provided that if, by 7 March 2025, the parties had not reached agreement, obtained an adjudication decision, or commenced court or arbitral proceedings on the underlying claims, the Escrow Sum would be paid out to SEI. A formal Escrow Agreement was subsequently concluded on 19 December 2024.

The parties' positions diverged as follows:

GMC argued that the 8 November letter was not binding because it formed part of "subject to contract" negotiations and was superseded by the entire agreement clause in the Escrow Agreement. GMC also contended that court proceedings (which it had issued on 5 March 2025 as a precaution) did not satisfy paragraph 6, because the sub-contract required disputes to be resolved by arbitration.
SEI argued that the 8 November letter constituted a concluded and binding agreement and that GMC had failed to satisfy the paragraph 6 conditions, such that the Escrow Sum should be paid out to SEI.

Decision

The court rejected GMC's argument that no binding agreement was reached until the Escrow Agreement was concluded on 19 December 2024. The opening paragraph of the 8 November letter expressly confirmed acceptance of GMC's offer, demonstrating that GMC itself considered a concluded agreement had been reached and was no longer proceeding "subject to contract". This was reinforced by the absence of any "subject to contract" heading in subsequent correspondence, the omission of the reservation of rights that had appeared in the earlier letter of 7 November 2024, and the fact that the conclusion of the Escrow Agreement was never suggested to be a pre-condition to a binding agreement.

The court held that the entire agreement clause in the Escrow Agreement's Standard Conditions related to the operation of the escrow mechanism and the relationship with the Escrow Agent - not to the substantive agreement between GMC and SEI. The Escrow Agreement itself expressly recognised the existence of "Supplemental Agreements" (including the 8 November letter), and confirmed that the escrow arrangements were designed solely to provide a mechanism for the deposit and release of escrow monies.

GMC issued Part 7 proceedings on 5 March 2025 (two days before the 7 March deadline) seeking declarations concerning SEI's entitlement to delay damages. The court found that these proceedings satisfied paragraph 6, rejecting SEI's argument that only arbitration could suffice. Nothing in paragraph 6 required arbitration to the exclusion of court proceedings, and clause 4.1.2 of the Escrow Agreement itself anticipated release of escrow monies on receipt of an order from a court, adjudicator, or arbitral tribunal. Whilst the proceedings might ultimately be subject to a stay, they had been validly commenced.

Key takeaways

Letters exchanged in urgent commercial circumstances may constitute binding contracts even if the parties contemplated a more formal agreement to follow.
Even if negotiations commence "subject to contract", that status can be removed - expressly or by necessary implication - if the parties' correspondence demonstrates they considered a concluded agreement to have been reached. If parties intend to maintain a "subject to contract" status, that label should appear on every material piece of correspondence, and it should be made clear in writing that no binding agreement has been reached until a formal document is executed.
Where obligations are spread across multiple instruments with different dispute resolution provisions, parties should ensure that: (i) the hierarchy of documents is expressly addressed; and (ii) dispute resolution provisions in subsidiary agreements are cross-referenced to, or carved out from, the regime in the primary contract.

Contributors: Claire Welch, Angad Singh, Priya Kaur

This publication is intended for general guidance and represents our understanding of the relevant law and practice as at June 2026. Specific advice should be sought for specific cases. For more information see our terms & conditions.

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